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The Case for Economizing on Government Controls 
Murray L. Weidenbaum 
It is always tempting to compare the ugly reality of what we oppose 
with the enchanting ideal of what we propose. This surely seems to be 
the case with the current wave of expanding government controls over 
the private sector. 
Are some consumer products unsafe? Are some working conditions 
unhealthy? Are some physical environments deteriorating? Are some 
employers discriminating in their personnel practices? The standard an-
swer seems to be clear: Just establish another corps of federal official-
dom with power to right these wrongs. 
Of course, one must possess the personality of a Scrooge to quarrel 
with the desirability of safer working conditions, better products for the 
consumer, combating discrimination in employment, or reducing envi-
ronmental pollution. And, to be sure, the programs established to deal 
with these issues have at times yielded substantial benefits to the public. 
But, unfortunately, any realistic evaluation of the actual practice of 
government regulation does not comfortably fit the notion of benign, 
beneficient, and wise men and women making altogether sensible deci-
sions in the society's greater interests. I must report that, in my study of 
The author is Professor of Economics, Washington University, St. Louis, Mis-
souri. This article was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association for 
Evolutionary Economics, San Francisco, California, 27-29 December 1974. It 
draws heavily on the author's study, Government-Mandated Price Increases 
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, in 
press). The author is indebted to Lee Benham and Edward Kalachek for helpful 
suggestions on an earlier draft. 
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the subject, I find instead waste, bias, stupidity, arrogance, concentra-
tion on trivia, conflicts among the regulators, and, worst of all, arbitrary 
and often uncontrolled power. Let me cite chapter and verse. 
The Cost of Regulation 
Purchasers of new cars produced in the United States in 1974 paid 
approximately $3 billion extra for the equipment and modifications 
needed to meet federal requirements.1 Mandatory auto buzzers and har-
nesses (the widely detested "interlock" system) will rapidly fade into 
history as examples of the highhandedness and wastefulness of govern-
ment regulation. Over 40 percent of the owners of those expensive 
contraptions disconnected them or otherwise found ways of avoiding 
their use prior to their elimination by the Congress. Nevertheless, the 
phenomenon of government adding to the costs of private production of 
goods and services as a convenient way of achieving public objectives 
without spending much, if any, government money on them seems likely 
to continue. 
Less dramatic but often equally expensive types of federal regulation 
remain with us. The agencies carrying them out are surely proliferating. 
In the past decade alone, we have seen the formation of the Consumer 
Product Safety Commission, the Occupational Safety and Health Com-
mission, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Federal Energy 
Administration, the Cost Accounting Standards Board, the National 
Bureau of Fire Prevention, the Mining Enforcement and Safety Admin-
istration, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the Na-
tional Transportation Safety Board, the Federal Metal and Nonmetallic 
Mine Safety Board of Review, and the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration, to cite some of the better known. 
The administrative cost of this galaxy of enforcers (approximately $2 
billion a year to support a regulatory workforce in excess of 63,000) 
represents merely the tip of the iceberg. It is the costs imposed on the 
private sector that are quantitatively important, and the major costs 
show up in the added expenses of business firms which must comply 
with various directives. A substantial "inflationary multiplier" thus must 
be applied to the direct outlays for federal controls. 
The process of federal regulation gives rise to a variety of added busi-
ness costs. U.S. Steel estimates that its superintendents and foremen 
spent 4,000 man-hours in 1972 guiding inspectors through its coal 
mines. The need for government inspectors also has siphoned off experi-
enced supervisory personnel. Consolidation Coal is said to have lost 600 
foremen to the ranks of federal inspectors. 
• .. 
I 
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A direct private cost resulting from the expansion of government con-
trols is the growing paperwork burden imposed on business firms: the 
expensive and time-consuming process of submitting reports, making 
applications, filling out questionnaires, replying to orders and directives, 
and appealing in the courts from other rulings and regulatory opinions. 
As of 30 June 1974 there were 5,146 different types of approved public 
use forms, in addition to tax and banking forms. Individuals and busi-
ness firms spend over 130 million man-hours a year filling out all the 
necessary federal reports.!! 
The lack of understanding between regulators and those they regulate 
is vividly conveyed in the interchange reported by a small manufacturer 
who attended a federal meeting on the paperwork burden. When he was 
advised not to worry about the matter personally but have his staff com-
plete the forms, he replied: "When I attend this meeting the staff is right 
here with me. It's me." 
A small, 5,000 watt radio station in New Hampshire reported that it 
spent $26.23 just to mail to the Federal Communications Commission 
its application for renewing its license. An Oregon company, operating 
three small television stations, reported that its license renewal applica-
tion weighed 45 pounds. At the other end of the spectrum, one large 
corporation, with about 40,000 employees, uses 125 file drawers of 
back-upmaterial just to meet the federal reporting requirements in the 
personnel area. The personnel manager contends that one-third of his 
staff could be eliminated if there were no federal, state, or local report-
ing requirements. 
The U.S. Office of Management and Budget estimates that the report-
ing burden imposed on U.S. business by the federal government in-
creased by 50 percent between December 1967 and June 1974. Major 
new programs were the principal source of the increase--occupational 
safety and health activities, Medicare and Medicaid, environmental pro-
tection regulations, and equal employment opportunity compliance. 
There are many other hidden costs that arise as a result of federal 
regulatory legislation. The Jones Act, requiring cargo shipments from 
one U.S. port to another to be made by U.S. vessels, adds 8 to 10 cents 
per million cubic feet to the cost of transporting liquified natural gas be-
tween Alaska and the West Coast. Attempts to avoid this "tax" result in 
the roundabout and more expensive process whereby Alaska exports the 
gas to other countries, and the mainland United States imports it from 
the South Pacific and Russia.3 
Another hidden cost is the reduced rate of innovation that may occur 
as the result of government controls. The longer it takes for some 
change to be approved by a federal regulatory agency-a new or im-
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proved product, a more efficient production process, and so forth-the 
less likely the change will be made. Professor William Wardell of the 
University of Rochester School of Medicine and Dentistry has con-
cluded that as a result of more liberal policy in the United Kingdom 
toward the introduction of new drugs, Britain experienced clearly dis-
cernible gains by introducing useful new drugs, either sooner than the 
United States or exclusively. 4 Professor Sam Peltzman of the University 
of Chicago estimates that the 1962 amendments to the Food and Drug 
Act delayed the introduction of effective drugs by about four years and 
added $200-$300 million a year to consumer costs.5 
The private costs of government regulation arise in good measure 
from the attitudes of the regulators. To quote a member of the Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission: "When it involves a product that is 
unsafe, I don't care how much it costs the company to correct the prob-
lem," and no one can fault the commission for not putting its money 
(and yours and mine) where its big mouth is. In one recent case where 
an offending company had not posted a label on its product bearing the 
correct officialese ("cannot be made non poisonous"), it was forced to 
destroy the contents. If you do not care about costs, apparently you do 
not think about such economical solutions as pasting a new label on the 
can. 
In contrast to the great attention given to the benefits that are expect-
ed to flow from each and every new regulation, the costs usually are ig-
nored. Let "them" pay for it; "they" can afford it; that seems to be the 
public attitude. The economic model underlying this approach is quite 
unusual. Government mandated costs of private production are assumed 
neither to be shifted forward to consumers nor backward to the factors 
of production. The costs presumably simply come out of profits, but 
without interfering with the needed flows of saving and investment-the 
proverbial "free lunch." 
Trivia and Nonsense 
An expected result of the lack of attention to the costs of regulation is 
the opportunity for bureaucrats to engage in all sorts of exercises in 
trivia and, on occasion, sheer nonsense. What size to establish for toilet 
partitions? How big is a hole? (It depends upon where it is.) When is a 
roof a floor? What colors should various parts of a building be painted? 
How frequently are spittoons to be cleaned? There actually are people 
willing to take our tax dollars to establish and administer regulations 
dealing with just these burning issues. And these are not historic relics, 
but directives promulgated during the 1970s. 
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Picture the plight of the small businessman who tries to deal with the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) rules without 
paying for expensive outside assistance. I have tried to by requesting 
copies of the introductory materials provided by the agency. Some 
examples stagger the mind. Let us begin with a supposedly simple 
matter, the definition of an exit. My dictionary says that exit is "a 
passage or way out." For OSHA enforcers, defining exit is a challenge 
to their bureaucratic instincts, and they are not found wanting. To 
OSHA, an exit is "that portion of a means of egress which is separated 
from all other spaces of the building or structure by construction or 
equipment as required in this subpart to provide a protected way of 
travel to the exit discharge." Obviously, I had to define "a means of 
egress" as well as an "exit discharge." Leaving seems to be easier than 
entering, at least the Kingdom of OSHA. Exit discharge is defined 
merely as "that portion of a means of egress between the termination of 
an exit and a public way." But now let us tackle "means of egress." 
Brace yourself. OSHA defines this as "a continuous and unobstructed 
way of exit travel from any point in a building or structure to a public 
way and consists of three separate and distinct parts: the way of exit 
access, the exit, and the way of exit discharge. A means of egress 
comprises the verticle and horizontal ways of travel and shall include 
intervening room spaces, doorways, hallways, corridors, passageways, 
balconies, ramps, stairs, enclosures, exits, escalators, horizontal exits, 
courts, and yards." The careful reader will note that, unlike the diction-
ary, OSHA is unable to provide a definition of exit which does not 
contain the word exit. And exit is a comparatively easy one. Try ladder, 
where the reader literally has to cope with three renditions of the same 
tedious set of definitions plus one trigonometric function. 
The puzzlement over OSHA regulations extends to the chairman of 
the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, the indepen-
dent agency created to hear appeals from rulings by OSHA inspectors. 
In response to a question about one vague standard: "What do you 
think it tells us to do?" he lamented: "I have no idea-and I don't think 
OSHA could tell you either, before an inspection, citation, complaint, 
hearing and post-hearing brief. I submit that there isn't a person on 
earth who can be certain he is in full compliance with the requirements 
of this standard at any particular point of time." 
The operation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act provides a 
pertinent example of how government regulation can lose sight of the 
basic objective. A company, particularly a smaller one without its own 
specialized safety personnel, which invites OSHA to come to the plant 
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to tell the management which practices need to be revised to meet the 
agency's standards, instantly lays itself open to citations for infractions 
of the OSHA rules and regulations. The law makes no provision for so-
called courtesy inspections. 
In order to circumvent the problem, one regional office of OSHA sug-
gests that companies take photographs of their premises and send them 
to OSHA for off-site review. After all, if the inspectors do not actually 
"see" the violations, they cannot issue citations for them. The more 
naive among us may believe that the basic purpose of the law is not to 
punish businessmen or to seek out the most costly and cumbersome 
method of meeting the statutory requirements, but to achieve a higher 
level of job safety. One can also hope that OSHA is undergoing a form 
of "on-the-job training" for new regulating agencies and that future 
rules and their interpretations will be less onerous. It is unfortunate, 
however, that business and consumers must serve as involuntary guinea 
pigs in the process. 
OSHA, to be sure, does not have a monopoly on regulatory foolish-
ness. An examination of the proposed Uniform Guidelines on Employee 
Selection Procedures is revealing. The guidelines were drafted by the 
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Coordinating Council in order to 
assure that selection procedures, in both the public and the private sec-
tors, do not discriminate against any group on the basis of race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin. The objective surely is a worthy one. 
Yet the proposed guidelines have been challenged by such professional 
organizations as the American Society for Personnel Administration and 
Division 14 of the American Psychological Association. 
A mere reading of the proposed regulations reveals the basis for con-
cern. Smaller employers would have great difficulty in understanding the 
regulations, while large and small companies alike would find compli-
ance difficult and expensive. The Coordinating Council does try to ease 
the burden on employers, but the result surely challenges the under-
standing of the typical executive: 
If a criterion-related or construct validation study is technically 
feasible in all other respects, but it is not technically feasible to 
conduct a differential prediction study when required by subpar-
agraph 14a ( 5) below and the test user has conducted a validation 
study for the job in question which otherwise meets the require-
ments of paragraph 14a below, the test user may continue to use 
the procedure operationally until such time as a differential pre-
diction study is feasible and has been conducted within a reason-
able time after it has become feasible. 
Economizing on Government Controls 
A selection procedure has criterion-related validity, for the pur-
pose of these guidelines, when the relationship between per-
formance on the procedure and performance on at least one rele-
vant criterion measure is statistically significant at the .05 level of 
significance .... If the relationship between a selection procedure 
and a criterion measure is significant but nonlinear, the score dis-
tribution should be studied to determine if there are sections of 
the regression curve with zero or near zero slope where scores do 
not reliably predict different levels of job performance. 
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Should these guidelines be enforced, the result is likely to be not 
fairer testing, but a shift from what would become more costly and 
cumbersome procedures to the simpler but far more bias-prone subjec-
tive interview. 
Bias and Double Standards 
The image of the all-wise and judicious government administration of 
controls is severely tested when we see how bias can be introduced into 
the process in the most innocent manner. The responsibility for doing 
the basic research underlying new job safety and health regulations has 
been assigned to the National Institute of Occupational Safety and 
Health (NIOSH) in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. 
In early 1974, NIOSH signed an agreement with the Amalgamated 
Clothing Workers union under which an official federal study of safety 
and health hazards in the clothing industry is to be conducted by a 
union employee and paid for by the union. In reporting this strange ar-
rangement, OSHA noted that the union will help obtain the cooperation 
of plant managers. 6 It is interesting to contemplate the reaction of man-
agement to an investigation of its premises by its union in behalf of the 
government! 
The double standard at times followed by federal regulators can be 
another cause for concern over the extent of the power entrusted to 
them. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is now studying 
the possible pollution which may result from the catalytic converters it 
has mandated for 1975 automobiles. Both private and government re-
searchers have shown that the new "antipollution" equipment may 
produce harmful amounts of sulphuric acid mists, which can irritate the 
lungs. The catalytic converters also emit platinum, which, in the words 
of the director of EPA's fuel and additive research program, is "really 
adding a new thing to our environment." Apparently, there is no 
significant amount of platinum in our air or water at the present time. 
Just think of the government and public outrage which would have 
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resulted if a private business firm had taken such action without submit-
ting a detailed environmental impact statement. 
Which Good Is Better? 
Perhaps it is inevitable, but the proliferation of government controls 
has led to conflicts among controls and controllers. In some cases, the 
rules of a given agency work at cross purposes with each other. For ex-
ample, OSHA mandates back-up alarms on vehicles at construction 
sites. Simultaneously, the agency requires employees to wear earplugs to 
protect them against noise, which can make it extremely difficult to hear 
the alarms. More serious and more frequent are the contradictions be-
tween the rulings of two or more government agencies where the regu-
lated have little recourse. 
The simple task of washing children's pajamas in New York State ex-
emplifies how two sets of laws can pit one worthy objective against an-
other, in this case ecology versus safety. Because of a ban on phos-
phates in detergents, the mother who launders her child's sleepwear in 
an ecologically sound way may risk washing away its required fire-resist-
ant properties. In 1973, in an effort to halt water pollution, New York 
State banned the sale of detergents containing phosphates. Less than 
two months later, a federal regulation took effect requiring all children's 
sleepwear in sizes 0 to 6X to be flame-retardant. New York housewives 
now face a dilemma, because phosphates are the strongest protector of 
fire-retardancy. Phosphates hold soil and minerals in solution, prevent-
ing the formation of a mask on the fabric that would inactivate flame-
resistancy. Soap and, to a lesser degree, many nonphosphate detergents 
redeposit those harmful items during the wash cycle. What does a con-
scientious mother do in a phosphate-banned area to avoid dressing her 
child in nightclothes that could burn up. Smuggle in the forbidden deter-
gent? Commit an illegal act of laundry? 
The controversy over restrooms furnishes another example of the 
conflict among different regulations and also demonstrates that common 
sense at times may be in short supply. The Labor Department, in ad-
ministering its weighty responsibilities under the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act, has provided private industry with detailed instructions 
concerning the size, shape, dimensions, and number of toilet seats. On 
the basis of a long accepted biological argument, some type of lounge 
area is required to be adjacent to women's restrooms. However, the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has entered this vital area 
of government-business relations. The commission requires that male 
toilet and lounge facilities, although separate, must be equal to those 
Economizing on Government Controls 
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provided for women. Hence, either equivalent lounges must be built ad-
jacent to the men's toilets, or the women's lounges must be dismantled, 
OSHA and state laws to the contrary notwithstanding. To those who 
may insist that nature did not create men and women with identical 
physical characteristics and needs, we can only reply that regulation, 
like justice, must be blind. 
Arbitrary Power 
The instances of. waste and foolishness on the part of government 
regulators may pale into insignificance when compared to the raw arbi-
trary power that can be, and at times is, exerted by federal regulators. 
To cite a member of the Consumer Product Safety Commission: "Any 
time that consumer safety is threatened, we're going to go for the com-
pany's throat." 
That this statement is not merely an overblown metaphor can be seen 
by examining the case of Marlin Toy Products, Inc., of Horicon, Wis-
consin. 7 The firm's two main products, Flutter Ball and Birdie Ball, 
were plastic toys for children, identical except that one contained a but-
terfly and the other a bird. The toys originally held plastic pellets that 
rattled. This led the Food and Drug Administration in 1972 to place the 
products on its ban list; if the toys cracked, the pellets could be swal-
lowed by a child. The company recalled the toys and redesigned its pro-
duct line to eliminate the pellets and thus be removed from the ban list. 
Now enter the newly formed Consumer Product Safety Commission 
(CPSC) in 1973, which had assumed responsibility in this area. Because 
of an "editorial error," it puts Marlin products on its new ban list, al-
though there is no longer any reason to ban them. Apparently, the com-
mission incorporated an out-of-date FDA list. The error was called to 
the commission's attention, but it replied that it was not about to recall 
250,000 lists "just to take one or two toys off." Marlin Toy Products re-
ports that it was forced out of the toy business and had to lay off 75 
percent of its employees due to the federal error. It is ironic to note that 
the commission, which specializes in ordering companies to recall their 
products if some defective ones may have been produced, refuses to re-
call its own product when there is a defect in every single one. 
A more humorous instance of the CPSC's failure to abide by its own 
standards involves the toy safety buttons which the commission intended 
to distribute in fall 197 4 in an effort to make consumers more safety 
conscious. Only after producing 80,000 buttons did the commission 
learn that its product was dangerous to children because of the lead 
paint and the possibility of breaking off and swallowing pieces of the 
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button. Unlike the procedures that it expects of the companies it regu-
lates, the commission presumably ran its tests after, rather than before, 
production. Fortunately, the commission realized its error prior to mak-
ing public distribution of the buttons. Hence, only a waste of resources 
and tax dollars was involved. 
It would be easier to excuse the commission for its blunders were it 
not for the arbitrary nature with which it exercises its power. Literally, 
a producer can be guilty unless he or she proves his or her innocence. 
The CPSC has ruled that "articles not meeting the requirements of the 
regulation are to be considered as banned even though they have not yet 
been reviewed,''8 that is, even if CPSC has not seen them or is unaware 
of their existence. 
There are limits to the extent to which the commission uses its vast 
powers, but one recent call was almost too close for comfort. The Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission actually considered, but ruled 
against, banning a book as a hazardous product. The concern was over 
scientific textbooks that allegedly fail to warn young readers of the in-
herent dangers in some experiments. In its ruling, the commission did 
warn publishers to be aware of this potential problem. 
It also appears that federal regulators literally do not have to obey the 
law. One such case involves the Kennecott Copper Corporation and the 
Environmental Protection Agency. The source of the company's com-
plaint is the lack of an EPA approved plan for the state of Nevada to 
meet federal clean air standards. A tentative plan was submitted in Jan-
uary 1972, but more than two years later the federal agency had neither 
approved it nor offered an alternative, as required by the Clean Air Act. 
The act stipulates EPA must act within six months. Kennecott is going 
ahead on its own with a $24 million project to clean up emissions from 
its Nevada smelter, hoping that ultimately it will receive the agency's 
approval. Kennecott has notified EPA that it plans to sue the agency for 
failure to obey the Clean Air Act of 1970. Such notification is required 
before the suit can be instituted. 
The literature does not give much attention to the role of the govern-
ment official as inspector. Yet this uninvited visitor tends to make his or 
her appearance with considerable frequency, and often without prior no-
tice. The Supreme Court recently ruled that air pollution inspectors do 
not need search warrants to enter the property of suspected polluters as 
long as they do not enter areas closed to the public. The unannounced 
and warrantless inspections were held not to be in violation of constitu-
tional protection against unreasonable search and seizure. 
The OSHA inspectors can go further. They have so-called no-knock 
power to enter the premises of virtually any business in the United 
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States without a warrant or even priot announcement. Jail terms are 
provided in the law for anyone tipping off an OSHA "raid." 
Nor are such arbitrary actions limited to the legislative and executive 
branches. One recent judicial decision on environmental regulation 
surely must leave the business community shaking its head in wonder-
ment. A federal district judge in Texas ordered the private developer of 
a community project near San Antonio to pay the attorney's fees for 
four citizens groups, even though the private developer was not even a 
party to the suit (it was filed against the federal government, which had 
accepted the developer's environmental impact statement) and the citi-
zen groups had lost the case. The court proclaimed the interesting doc-
trine that, since private citizens carry much of the burden of seeing that 
federal environmental policy is carried out, awarding them their 
costs-even if they lose-will help ensure that information concerning 
projects and their impact on the environment will become public (Sierra 
Club v. Lynn, West. Dist. Tex.). 
The Possible Shape of Things to Come 
We can obtain some understanding of the future consequences of the 
path on which the nation has embarked by examining that sector of 
U.S. industry which already has gone down the road of government 
control to the greatest degree. Over a period of three decades, the major 
defense contractors have grown accustomed to the federal government 
making the basic decisions about which products are to be produced, 
how the firm is to go about producing them, and how capital is to be 
provided. In the process, the federal government has assumed a major 
portion of the risk and the role of the entrepreneur. 
One senior Pentagon official described with considerable enthusiasm 
his visit to a large defense contractor and its role with the military ser-
vice regulating its operations: "I was impressed with the complete inter-
relationship of the Service/ contractor organizations. They are virtually 
co-located .... The Service is aware of and, in fact, participates in prac-
tically every major contractor decision. "9 It may not be altogether coin-
cidental that the two largest and most government-dependent of the 
defense contractors-Lockheed and General Dynamics-are precisely 
the firms whose products have come under greatest attack for cost over-
runs and other basic shortcomings. More C5As and TFXs (to cite two 
of their better-known products) would seem to be rather poor preced-
ents for future public policy. 
This article is not intended to be a simpleminded attack on all forms 
of government control over industry. A society, acting through govern-
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ment, can and should act to protect consumers against rapacious sellers, 
individual workers against unscrupulous employers, and future gener-
ations against those who would waste the nation's resources. But, as in 
most areas of life, the sensible questions are not matters of either/or, 
but rather of more or less. Thus, we enthusiastically can advocate 
stringent controls to avoid infant crib deaths without simultaneously 
supporting a plethora of detailed federal rules and regulations dealing 
with the color of exit lights and the maintenance of cuspidors. 
A New Departure 
We need a fundamental rethinking of the attitude that government in-
creasingly should involve itself in what traditionally has been internal 
business decision making. Viewing the process of determining national 
priorities as a two-step affair is one possibility. The first step should con-
tinue, as at present, to focus on determining how much of our resources 
should be devoted to defense, welfare, education, and so forth, at least 
to the extent that these basic issues are now decided by design at all. 
This determination should be accompanied by a tentative allocation 
of responsibilities among the major sectors of the economy. Such indica-
tive planning would recognize that the constant and increasing nibbling 
away at business prerogatives and entrepreneurial capacity has a very 
substantial cost: reduced effectiveness in achieving basic national objec-
tives, notably (to use the language of the Employment Act) "maximum 
employment, production, and purchasing power." 
At a time when cost-benefit analysis has become fashionable, we 
should not be oblivious to the very real effects of converting ostensibly 
private organizations into involuntary agents of the federal establish-
ment. Rather, the nation should determine which of its objectives can be 
achieved more effectively in the private sector and attempt to create an 
environment which is more conducive to the attainment of those objec-
tives. 
It is reasonable to anticipate that primarily social objectives, such as 
improved police services, would continue to be the primary province of 
government. But primarily economic objectives, notably training, mo-
tivating, and usefully employing the bulk of the nation's work force, 
would be viewed as mainly the responsibility of the private sector, and 
especially of business firms. 
The new model of national decision making hardly calls for an abdi-
cation of government concern with the various problems discussed here. 
Rather, it would require a redirection of the methods selected to achieve 
those ends. In the environmental area, for example, the current depen-
I , 
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dence on direct controls would be reduced in favor of the more indirect 
but powerful incentives available through the price system. Specifically, 
imaginative use of "sumptuary" excise taxation, such as we have grown 
accustomed to in the cases of tobacco products and alcoholic beverages, 
can be used to alter basic production and consumption patterns. The de-
sired results would not be accomplished by fiat, but by making the 
high-pollutant product or service more expensive relative to the low-pol-
lutant product or service. The basic guiding principle would be that peo-
ple and organizations do not pollute because they enjoy messing up the 
environment; they pollute because it is easier or cheaper to do so. In 
lieu of a corps of regulators, we would use the price system to make pol-
luting harder and more expensive. A similar opportunity for sumptuary 
taxation in lieu of government controls is now presenting itself with 
reference to energy. 
In the job safety area, the law seems to have lost sight of the basic 
objective: a healthier working environment. As we have seen, the cur-
rent emphasis is on punishing violators. In the more positive spirit sug-
gested here, the basic thrust of occupational safety and health legislation 
would be changed from prescribing and proscribing specific practices to 
focusing on desired reductions in the accident and health hazard rates in 
a given factory or industry. It is doubtful that there is an invariant way 
of achieving that desirable result. Changes in equipment, variations in 
working practices, training of employees, and leadership on the part of 
management all may be practical alternatives. Presumably we should 
opt for the mix of methods which entails the least cost, and those com-
binations probably would vary from plant to plant and over time. 
Perhaps one of the least understood forms of government control is 
over the direction of the flow of saving and investment. This is accom-
plished through the use of the government's credit power, involving "off-
budget" agencies such as the Export-Import Bank, loan guarantees such 
as those given the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, and establishment of 
a galaxy of government-sponsored borrowers and lenders (usually re-
ferred to by their nicknames, "Fanny Mae," "Ginny Mae," "Sally Mae," 
"Fanny Rae," and "Freddy Mac"). None of these federal instrumen-
talities do much to add to the available pool of investment funds. 
Rather, they bid funds away from unprotected and truly private bor-
rowers. In every period of tight credit, there is a predictable clamor to 
set up still more federal credit agencies to "protect" borrowers not now 
under the federal umbrella. Clearly, a more positive and fruitful ap-
proach would be to create an economic environment which provides 
more incentive to save and thus results in a larger pool of investment 
funds becoming available to the society as a whole. 
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The moral of the tale should be clear by now: Because of the very 
substantial costs and other adverse side effects to which they give rise, 
the existing array of government controls over business should be given 
a new and hard look by society. Substantial attention should be paid to 
the possibility of cutting back or eliminating those controls that generate 
excessive costs and other disadvantages. Rather than blithely continuing 
to proliferate the usage of government controls over business, alterna-
tive means of achieving important rational objectives should be ex-
plored and developed. 
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